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Case No. 20090854-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Lucia Arnold & Vanessa Arnold,
Defendants/ Appellants.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendants appeal their convictions for third degree felony retail theft. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(3) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Defendants were charged with retail theft. At the preliminary hearing, they
claimed that several department store employees and Provo City police officers
framed them, and that this conspiracy was motivated by a lawsuit one of the
Defendants had filed several years earlier against Skip Curtis, a Deputy Utah
County Sheriff. Before trial, the trial court barred the Defendants from testifying
about the Curtis lawsuit.
Issue: Was Defendants' trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not
arguing at trial that the State had opened the door for testimony about the Curtis

lawsuit, where raising this claim would have allowed the State to prove that the
Defendants were lying about one of their central claims?
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, % 6,89
P.3d 162.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants were charged with retail theft. R. 346 at 6-7; R. 347 at 5-6.' A jury
convicted both Defendants. R. 346 at 156; R. 347 at 155.

1

This is a consolidated appeal from cases 081401346 and 081401347. The
Defendants were tried together below. When necessary to distinguish the two
cases, the State will cite to the records as R. 346 at
and R. 347 at
. To avoid
redundancy, the State will cite to the transcripts as R. 255:
(preliminary hearing),
244:
(trial, day 1), and 243:
(trial, day 2).

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS*
Lucia and Vanessa Arnold are caught with $1049
worth of concealed clothing
On May 7, 2008, Scott McDermeit was working as the security camera
operator at the Dillard's department store in Provo when he noticed Lucia and
Vanessa Arnold. R. 244: 99-100. McDermeit recognized the two women from an
incident earlier that week when he had observed them acting suspiciously. R. 244:
101. McDermeit noticed that Lucia and Vanessa were gathering a large number of
items, and that each was carrying a large shopping bag from another store. R. 244:
101.
At 7:54 p.m., Lucia and Vanessa entered a dressing room with about 15 items
each. R. 244: 101, 103; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44.3 About 20 minutes later, Lucia
emerged from the dressing room, empty-handed. See R. 244:103; State's Exh. 1 at 7:
54: 44 to 8: 14: 44. Lucia then "grabbed some more items and went back into the
dressing room/7 R. 244:103. Lucia repeated this pattern "two or three" more times.
R. 244:103; see also State's Exh. 1 at 8:31:35, 8:35:40, 8:36:58, 8:38:14.
2

The "evidence and all reasonable inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it" are recited "in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992) (quotations and citation omitted).
State's Exhibit 1 is a DVD of the security camera footage that was introduced
at trial. It is contained in a manila exhibits folder in the record.
3

McDermeit thought this suspicious, so he alerted Chris Hendricksen, an offduty police officer who worked part-time at Dillard's as a store security officer. R.
244: 105. He also alerted several store employees, who began watching Lucia's
behavior. R. 244:105.
At 8:40, both Lucia and Vanessa emerged from the dressing rooms. State's
Exh. 1 at 8:40:01. Vanessa had not left the dressing room a single time during the
intervening 46 minutes. R. 244:125,135; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44 to 8:40:01. After
Lucia put a few items on the rack, the two women began walking towards an exit
carrying nothing but the shopping bags they had brought into the store. State's Exh.
1 at 8:40:53.
McDermeit focused the security camera on the bags and saw that they were
noticeably heavier than when Lucia and Vanessa had first entered the dressing
rooms. R. 244:105; compare State's Exh. 1 at 7:48: 23 with id. at 8:40:37. While the
bags had appeared light before, their draw strings were now taut, and the women
were "having trouble picking them up." R. 244: 105-06, 167.

McDermeit

immediately dispatched an employee to the dressing room to see if the women had
left any of the clothing behind. R. 244:106. They had not. R. 244:106.
McDermeit alerted Hendrickson about the possible theft. R. 244:105. He also
contacted the Provo City police and asked them to send an officer. R. 244:127.
4

Still carrying their bags, Lucia and Vanessa walked toward a store exit. R.
244: 106-07. As they passed the doors, Hendricksen approached the women,
identified himself as a store security officer, and asked them to accompany him to a
manager's office. R. 244: 167. Hendricksen was with Arloha Sutherland, a store
manager, who was asked to accompany Hendricksen because the two suspects were
females. R. 244:167,198-200.
Hendricksen and Sutherland escorted the two women to an office. At that
point, Lucia and Vanessa started speaking Spanish to each other. R. 244:167. When
Hendricksen tried to talk to them in English, the two claimed to be unable to
communicate in English. R. 244:171,201. This seemed odd, given that Sutherland
had spoken to Vanessa in English earlier that evening. R. 244:199.
Hendricksen then picked up one of the bags that Lucia and Vanessa had
carried into the store. R. 244:168. The bag was from Foot Locker and had a shoe
box inside with a string tied around it. R. 244:168. Hendricksen thought that the
bag was "a lot heavier than a pair of shoes would be." R. 244:168. Hendricksen cut
the string, opened the box, and found a number of clothing items inside, " tightly
folded up and rolled up/' R. 244:168; see also R. 244:201. He then looked inside the
other bags and found similar stacks of clothing inside, all tightly rolled inside shoe
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boxes. R. 244:168, 201. When Hendricksen and Sutherland later inventoried the
items concealed in the bags, the total value was $1049. R. 244: 208.
Officer Douglas Straddling of the Provo Police Department arrived. R. 243:
231,236. Straddling did not speak Spanish, and he was concerned that Defendants'
continued conversations in Spanish would allow them to coordinate their stories. R.
243: 236. After unsuccessfully trying to get them to stop speaking to each other,
Straddling decided to move Vanessa to an adjoining room. R. 243: 237-38. When
Vanessa physically resisted, he placed her in handcuffs. 244:174-75,209-10. At that
point, Lucia stood up and, in "perfect English/' yelled: "Get your f-ing hand off my
daughter. I want to talk to my attorney/' R. 244:175; see also R. 244: 211.
Officer Straddling found a pair of car keys while searching Vanessa. R. 243:
241. Officer Brad Partridge from the Provo City Police Department then located
Vanessa's car in the parking lot. R. 243: 261, 264-65. Looking inside, Partridge,
Straddling, and Hendricksen all saw a stack of tightly rolled-up department store
clothing on the back seat. R. 243: 243, 265; 244:178. Lucia and Vanessa were both
subsequently charged with retail theft. R. 346 at 6-7; R. 347 at 5-6.

6

The trial court denies Defendants7 request to testify about a lawsuit that
Vanessa had filed against a Utah County Sheriff's Deputy
several years earlier
Hendricksen and Straddling testified in behalf of the State at the preliminary
hearing. R. 255: 6-45 (Hendricksen), 45-76 (Straddling). On cross-examination,
defense counsel repeatedly suggested that the officers had framed Lucia and
Vanessa.

R. 255: 21-43, 53-76. Defense counsel's cross-examination further

suggested that the officers were motivated by a lawsuit that Vanessa had filed
several years earlier against Skip Curtis, a deputy sheriff with the Utah County
Sheriffs Office. R. 255: 21-22, 70-76. As part of this claim, defense counsel alleged
that when Officer Straddling transported Vanessa to the jail for booking, he stopped
the car along the way, at which point Curtis had opened the door, put a gun to
Vanessa's head, and threatened to kill her if she did not drop her suit. R. 255: 70-76.
After Defendants were bound over, the State filed a motion to prevent them
from testifying about the Skip Curtis suit and Curtis' alleged involvement in this
case. R. 346 at 120-29; R. 347 at 120-28. In that motion, the State proffered that
Vanessa had sued Deputy Curtis several years earlier, that she had lost the case at
trial, and that her appeal was pending. R. 346 at 128. The State then stressed that
there was no evidence that Deputy Curtis or even the Utah County Sheriffs Office
was involved in this investigation. It accordingly argued that Defendants'
7

speculative claims should be barred under rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence. R. 346 at 122-28.
Judge Gary Stott heard arguments on the motion before trial. R. 244: 3-12.
During argument, the State further proferred that it had passport stamps, airline
tickets, and photographs showing that Skip Curtis was actually in Amman, Jordan,
on the day of this incident, and that he therefore could not have threatened Vanessa
alongside the road in Orem as she was claiming. R. 244: 8.
The trial court granted the State's motion, ordering that the parties could not
refer to Vanessa's suit against Skip Curtis or attempt to implicate him in the alleged
conspiracy. R. 244:10-14.
Trial
At trial, the State presented testimony from McDermeit, Hendricksen,
Sutherland, Officer Straddling, and Officer Partridge, all of whom testified about the
Defendants7 incriminating behavior. See R. 243: 231-65; 244: 94-220. The State also
introduced footage from the security cameras as an exhibit. See State's Exh. 1. As
discussed above, that footage showed Lucia and Vanessa walking into the dressing
rooms with their arms full of clothes, Lucia repeatedly emerging to get more clothes,
and the two Defendants leaving the dressing room 46 minutes later carrying two
heavy shopping bags from other stores. See generally State's Exh. 1 at 7:47 to 8:40.
8

Defendants testified in their case-in-chief. Lucia and Vanessa both testified
that they never placed any clothing inside their shopping bags and that the evidence
against them had been fabricated. See generally R. 243: 281-316 (Lucia), 320-331
(Vanessa). They further claimed that there had been a conspiracy involving
McDermeit, Hendricksen, Sutherland, Officer Straddling, and several other
unidentified Dillard's employees who assisted in the investigation, and possibly
Officer Partridge as well. See generally id. Defendants testified that the conspiracy
appeared to be the result of racial animus. R. 243: 292,294. They also claimed that
during the encounter in the office, Straddling had slapped Vanessa across the face,
thrown her to the ground without provocation, and put his hands down her pants
and fondled her vagina. R. 243: 298, 325-26, 331.
On cross-examination, the State focused on the scope of the alleged
conspiracy, arguing that the sheer number of people involved made it implausible.
See, e.g., R. 243:301-04,314. The State also showed that the allegations were at odds
with the Defendants' subsequent behavior. For example, the State pointed out that
Vanessa never filed charges against Officer Straddling for the alleged abuse, and
that neither woman had complained to Dillard's about the alleged conduct of its
employees. R. 243: 315-16. Moreover, although both women had claimed that
Vanessa had needed 46 minutes in the dressing room because physical disabilities
9

made it hard for her to move, the security camera footage showed her walking
around without any physical restriction that evening. R. 243: 330.
Although the prosecutor questioned the validity of the claimed conspiracy, he
never mentioned Skip Curtis or the prior claims regarding his alleged involvement
in the alleged conspiracy. See generally R. 243:300-317 (cross-examination of Lucia),
328-34 (cross-examination of Vanessa).
After trial, a new judge suggests that the prosecutor might have opened the
door for testimony about the Skip Curtis allegation
The jury convicted both Defendants. R. 243: 383. After trial, Defendants
moved to set aside the verdicts. R. 346:174-81; R. 347:186-76. Defendants raised
several claims, including that the prosecutor had opened the door their claims about
Skip Curtis by "repeatedly ask[ing], "Why would the store personnel want to hurt
you." R. 346 at 175. Defendants offered no record citation for this alleged question.
In the interim, the case had been transferred from Judge Stott to Judge David
Mortenson. On August 19, 2009, Judge Mortensen issued an order denying
Defendant's claims. R. 197-202. With respect to the Skip Curtis issue, Judge
Mortensen agreed that the prosecutor had "opened the door" for that testimony by
asking " [W]hy would store personnel want to hurt you?" R. 346 at 197. But Judge
Mortensen concluded that because defense counsel had not asked Judge Stott for a
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"release[ ] from the earlier order/' there was no basis to overturn the verdict. R. 346
at 197. Judge Mortensen then gave the Defendants probation. R. 242:12,16.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants argue that their trial counsel performed deficiently by not arguing
that the prosecutor had opened the door for testimony about the Skip Curtis lawsuit
during his cross-examinations of them. This claim fails for two reasons.
First, Defendants have not shown deficient performance. As an initial matter,
the claim is inadequately briefed. Defendants do not identify the questions that they
believe opened the door for this testimony, nor do they support their claim with any
authority showing that the motion would have been successful.

But more

importantly, Defendant's claim also fails because defense counsel had a legitimate
strategic basis for not making the motion mid-trial. Specifically, the prosecutor had
already explained that if Defendants made this claim, the prosecutor had physical
evidence that would have shown that Vanessa was lying about Curtis' whereabouts
on the day in question. Thus, defense counsel's decision to not raise this issue was
presumptively motivated by a desire to keep this damaging evidence out.
Second, Defendants have failed to show that they were prejudiced by the
alleged deficient performance. Although Defendants now claim that the conspiracy
against them was motivated by the Skip Curtis lawsuit, they have presented no
11

evidence establishing any connection between Curtis and this criminal
investigation. Moreover, the case against them at trial was based on testimony from
five different witnesses, as well as surveillance video that corroborated their claims.
Given this, there is no probability, let alone a reasonable probability, that the result
would have been any different if Defendants had been allowed to offer this
testimony.
ARGUMENT
I.
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
ASK THE TRIAL COURT TO REVISIT ITS RULING EXCLUDING
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE CURTIS LAWSUIT
Defendants claim that the prosecutor " opened the door to evidence of the
Skip Curtis lawsuit" during his cross-examinations of them. Aplt. Br. 12. They
accordingly argue that trial counsel was ineffective for not "seek[ing] release from
the Court's order excluding evidence relating to Skip Curtis/' Aplt. Br. 11-15. But
Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating deficient performance,
because the record shows that there were legitimate strategic reasons for this
decision. And Defendants have also failed to carry their burden of establishing
prejudice, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt that was presented at trial.

12

A. Background law.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendants must satisfy the twopart test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
First, Defendants must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient by
identifying specific acts or omissions that fall outside reasonable professional
judgment.

Id. at 687-88, 690.

An appellate court "must indulge a strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial
strategy.'" Id. at 689 (citation omitted). Defendants can prevail only by showing
that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct.
770,787 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted). Defendants must prove that there
is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT
25, f 7, 89 P.3d 162; State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, | 58, 61 P.3d 291.
Second, Defendants must show that "there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel[s]' unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
1 19, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). "A reasonable
13

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. It is
not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of
the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable/' Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quotations
and citation omitted). "Because some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture,
and some will have had an isolated trivial effect, in determining the effect of the
error, we 'consider the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury." State v. Hales,
2007 UT 14,1 86,152 P.3d 321 (quotations and citation omitted).
When raising an ineffective assistance claim, Defendants bear the burden of
assuring that "the record is adequate." Litherland, 2000 UT 76,116. As a result, "an
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is
supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at
Tf 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that
counsel performed effectively." Id. Defendant's proof of prejudice must be based on
a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50
(quotations and citation omitted).

14

B, Defendants have not shown that their counsel performed
deficiently.
As noted, Defendants claim that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing
to seek a "release from the trial court's order" preventing them from testifying about
the Skip Curtis lawsuit. Aplt. Br. 10-13. Defendants have not met their burden for
two reasons.
First, they have not adequately briefed this claim. The rules of appellate
procedure require a party to set forth the "contentions and reasons... with respect
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on/' Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "An argument that does not contain 'reasoned
analysis based upon relevant legal authority' is inadequately briefed and we will
not consider the issue." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 15 n.l, 72 R3d 138
(citation omitted).
Here, Defendants claim that the prosecutor opened the door for the trial court
to reconsider its pretrial ruling excluding testimony about the Curtis lawsuit. But
the Argument section of Defendants7 brief cites no place in the record where the
prosecutor allegedly opened the door for this evidence, let alone identify any
particular question that did. See Aplt. Br. 10-13. Instead, Defendants only attempt

15

to articulate how this occurred in a single sentence in their Statement of the Case,
alleging that the State had "focused on the apparent lack of a motive for the
conspiracy" by "posing questions such as 'Mr. Hendrickson, he really wants to hurt
you, doesn't he?'" Aplt. Br. 5. This does not satisfy rule 24(a)(9), which requires a
party to adequately brief its contentions within the Argument section. Id.
Defendants also cite no legal authority — from Utah or elsewhere — setting
forth the standards by which a party "opens the door" for admission of evidence
that had already been excluded. See Aplt. Br. 10-13. This, too, violates rule 24(a)(9),
which requires "development" and "reasoned analysis" of authority that supports a
party's position. State v. Tliomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Here, Defendants
have not even attempted to show how the unidentified questions opened the door
for testimony of the Curtis suit, a necessary predicate for showing that counsel was
deficient for not raising the motion. Thus, Defendants have inadequately briefed
their claim.
Second, even if Defendants had adequately briefed this claim, it still fails
because Defendants have not rebutted the presumption that their counsel had a
legitimate reason for not making this motion.
As noted in Defendants' brief, Lucia and Vanessa would have claimed that
Hendricksen referred to Vanessa as "the individual that sued Skip Curtis" while at
16

the Dillard's office. Aplt. Br. 4. Defendants also claim that Vanessa would have
testified that Officer Straddling had pulled over en route to the jail, whereupon
Curtis ''opened the door of Straddling's patrol car, put a gun" to Vanessa's head,
and "instructed her to terminate the lawsuit against him." Aplt. Br. 4.
When the issue was raised on the first day of trial, however, the prosecutor
said that he had documentary evidence that would have disproven this claim.
Specifically, the prosecutor had passport stamps, airline tickets, and photographs
proving that Skip Curtis could not have threatened Vanessa that day because he
was actually in Amman, Jordan. R. 244: 8.
Given this, defense counsel had a reasonable basis for not attempting to raise
this issue again at trial—specifically, to avoid having Vanessa offer testimony that
could be proven false. While credibility is always an important issue, it was
particularly important here given the nature of the defense. As discussed above, the
State's case was supported by the testimony of five witnesses.

To prevail,

Defendants had to convince the jury that the State's witnesses were not telling the
truth. But the encounter in the manager's office was not recorded, and Defendants
had no other extrinsic proof that the State's witnesses were lying. Thus, their
defense ultimately hinged on their own personal credibility. They had to convince
the jury that they were telling the truth and that the State's witnesses were not.
17

In this context, defense counsel's mid-trial decision to not try to reintroduce
Defendants' claims about Skip Curtis appears to have been eminently reasonable. If
)

counsel had successfully made this motion, the State would have then been allowed
to officer extrinsic evidence showing that Vanessa was lying about Skip Curtis being
in Orem that day, thereby fatally damaging the Defendants' credibility-based
defense.
As noted above, Defendants can only prevail by proving that that there was
no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 7;
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, % 58. Preserving a defendant's credibility in a credibilitybased defense is a perfectly reasonable trial strategy.

Defendant's deficient

performance claim thus fails.
C Defendants also have not shown that they were prejudiced by the
alleged deficient performance.
As noted, Defendants must also show that, absent counsel's acts or omissions,
there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50.
Defendants have not shown this here.
As an initial matter, Defendants have not offered any proof that the alleged
conspiracy was actually motivated by the Curtis lawsuit. At the preliminary
hearing, for example, Hendricksen testified that he knew Curtis, but declined to
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describe him as a "friend." R. 255: 21. More importantly, Hendricksen and Officer
Straddling both denied that Curtis had anything to do with this case. R. 255: 72-73.
Defendants point to no evidence contradicting this — specifically, they point
to no evidence showing that Hendricksen, Straddling, or anyone else involved in
this case was so close to Curtis that they would have been motivated to orchestrate a
criminal conspiracy on his behalf. And they also point to no evidence showing that
Curtis or anybody else had any need to violently threaten them. As explained by
the prosecutor, Vanessa's suit against Curtis was several years old, and Curtis had
already won at trial at the time of this alleged incident. R. 346 at 128. Thus, he
would have had little reason to orchestrate a broad criminal conspiracy to stop
Vanessa from pursuing an appeal of a case that he had already won.
But more importantly, Defendants' claim fails because even if they had been
allowed to testify about the Curtis lawsuit, there is no reasonable probability that
this testimony would have changed the result of the criminal trial. As noted, courts
"consider the totality of the evidence before the ... jury" when assessing a claim of
prejudice. Hales, 2007 UT 14, If 86.
Here, Lucia and Vanessa could have testified about their suspicions that
Curtis had been involved, and Vanessa could have testified about her claim that
Curtis had physically threatened her en route to the jail. But the State would have
19

then offered sworn testimony from Hendricksen and Officer Straddling that Curtis
was not involved, as well as documentary proof showing that he could not have
threatened Vanessa that day because he was in Amman, Jordan. R. 244: 8. As
discussed above, this would have seriously undercut Vanessa's credibility, which
was necessarily a critical component of Defendants' credibility-based defense.
Moreover, the State also still had overwhelming evidence showing that
Defendants committed retail theft. Defendants were caught on a security camera
carrying shopping bags into Dillard's, loading their arms up with clothing, and then
taking it to a dressing room. See R. 244:101-03; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44. The security
camera footage showed that Vanessa remained in the dressing room for 46 minutes
without leaving, and that in the interim, Lucia repeatedly came out, grabbed more
clothes, and took them to Vanessa in the dressing room. R. 244:103; see also State's
Exh. 1 at 8:31:35, 8:35:40, 8:36:58, 8:38:14. The footage also showed that when the
two emerged 46 minutes later, they left without any merchandise, but with
noticeably heavier bags. R. 244:105,125,135; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44 to 8:40:01.
In addition to the uncontested video evidence, several witnesses testified
about their personal observations of Defendants' retail theft. The encounter in the
manager's office was described by Hendricksen, Sutherland, McDermeit, and
Straddling. R. 243: 234-42; 244:129-30,167-77,199-211, Partridge, Straddling, and
20

Hendricksen also testified about similar stacks of rolled up clothing that were in
Defendants7 car. R. 243: 243,265; 244:178.
Defendants' only response at trial was to offer their own contrary version of
the events. They claimed that they never put anything in their bags, and that this
large group of people were all engaged in a conspiracy to frame them.
Although the jury heard this account, it did not believe it. There is no
probability, let alone a reasonable probability, that the jury would have changed its
mind if the Defendants had also been able to testify, without corroboration, that
they had unsuccessfully sued a police officer several years earlier, where that officer
worked for a different police agency, was not involved in this investigation, was
apparently unconnected to anyone involved in this investigation, and was on the
other side of the world when this crime occurred.
In short, Defendants' speculative claim is unsupported by any proof, and its
potential impact on this case was, at most, tenuous. Defendants have not shown
prejudice, and their ineffective assistance claim must accordingly be denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendants' convictions.
Respectfully submitted March H , 2011.
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